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International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Accountancy Corp.: Third Party
Liability-Accountants Beware
The California Court of Appeal for the Fourth District recently
held in International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy
Corp.' that an independent auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably
foreseeable plaintiffs who rely on unqualified 2 reports issued on audited
financial statements.3 The court of appeal rejected both the well
established privity requirement of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,4 and
the more recent knowing reliance standard, which holds accountants
liable to foreseeable plaintiffs who rely on audited financial state-
ments. 5 Instead, the California Court of Appeal held that accountants
are subject to the same standards of tort liability as are other profes-
sionals in California. The International Mortgage Co. court noted the
changing role of accountants in our society, specifically pointing to
the profession's increasing independence from clients and the profes-
sion's function as "public watchdogs." ' 6 The court also emphasized
the ability of-the accounting profession to pass the risk of loss on to
1. 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218 (1986), modified, 178 Cal. App. 3d 682h,
review denied, May 29, 1986.
2. An unqualified report is issued when the auditor follows generally accepted auditing
standards in conducting the examination of the client's financial statements and, in the opinion
of the auditor, the financial statements are fairly stated in accord with generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP). Conditions may prevent strict adherence to GAAP or the auditor
may find that the financial statements are not fair in which case the auditor will issue a qualified
opinion, disclaimer, or adverse opinion. D. TAYLOR & G. W. GL.EZEN, AutrrNG: INTEGRATED
CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES 18 (3d ed. 1985).
3. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. See infra
notes 26-51 and accompanying text (discussion of International Mortgage Co. opinion). Financial
statements consist of a balance sheet, an income statement, and a statement of change in financial
position. W. MEIGs & R. MEiGs, ACCOUNTING: THE BASIs FOR BUsINEss DECIsIONs 14 (5th ed.
1981).
4. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text
(discussion of Ultramares).
5. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27. See
infra notes 72-85 and accompanying text (discussion of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552
(1977)).
6. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27. See
infra notes 40-47 and accompanying text (discussion of modern role of accountants).
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its clients and the ultimate consuming public through fee increases and
insurance.7
Part I of this note will set forth the facts of International Mortgage
Co. and review the decision of the court of appeal.8 Part II will
discuss the legal background of accountant liability to third parties
for negligence.9 Finally, part III will examine the legal ramifications




In March 1979, John P. Butler Accountancy Corp. (Butler) issued
unqualified reports based on audited financial statements for the year
ending December 31, 1978, to Westside Mortgage, Inc. (Westside)."
Fifty-seven percent of Westside's stated net worth was attributable to
a secured promissory note. 2 The note was worthless due to a prior
foreclosure of a senior lien on the real property securing the loan. 3
Without the promissory note as an asset, Westside did not qualify to
do business in Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured loans. 4
At the time of the audit, Butler was aware of the minimum net worth
requirement for participation in FHA business. 5
In late 1979, Westside gave International Mortgage Company (IMC)
copies of the audited financial statements.' 6 IMC allegedly relied on
these statements in entering into contracts with Westside to do business
in FHA loans. 17 Butler had no knowledge of IMC at the time of the
audit, nor was Butler aware of IMC's receipt of and reliance upon
Westside's financial statements.' 8 IMC did not contact Butler to verify
that the financial statements presented fairly the financial position and
results of operation of Westside.' 9 After entering into a series of
7. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
8. See infra notes 11-51 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 52-104 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 105-134 and accompanying text.
11. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 809, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
12. Id. at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
13. Id. at 809, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
14. Id. at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219. A minimum net worth of $100,000 is required to
participate in FHA business. 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.3-203.5 (1985).
15. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
16. Id. at 809, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
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contracts to sell government loans to IMC, Westside failed to deliver
the trust deeds to IMC, resulting in alleged damages of $475,293.20
Westside issued a promissory note to IMC for the $475,293, but
defaulted after paying only $40,000.21 IMC sued Butler for damages,"
alleging negligence and negligent misrepresentation.2 The trial court
granted Butler's motion for summary judgment based on the tradi-
tional rule that a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) owes no duty of
care to a third party who was not specifically known to the accountant
as an intended recipient of the audited financial statements. 24 IMC
appealed the trial court's decision.2?
B. The Opinion
The California Court of Appeal reversed, holding that an inde-
pendent auditor owes a duty of care to reasonably foreseeable state-
ment users who rely on unqualified reports issued on audited financial
statements. 26 Beginning with a review of Justice Cardozo's seminal
opinion in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,27 the International Mortgage
Co. court noted that the application of the duty doctrine to the
accounting profession has been unique.2 Under the Ultramares rule,
accountants have been shielded from liability for negligence in the
audit of financial statements and issuance of unqualified audit reports,
except to those in privity with the accountant.2 9 The California Court
of Appeal referred to the fact that even as Ultramares was being
accepted, the tide of precedent had already begun to move against the
privity rule.30 Although the erosion of the privity rule continued as to
other professionals, accountants remained untouched by the trend.3
20. Id. at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
21. Id. at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
22. Id. Only IMC's claim against Butler was before the court on this appeal. Id. at 810
n.1, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220 n.1. However, IMC also sued Westside under the same theories. Id.
at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
23. Id. at 810, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 820-21, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
27. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text
(discussion of Ultramares).
28. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 811, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
29. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 180, 174 N.E. at 444; International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal.
App. 3d at 811, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 220.
30. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221. See infra
note 47 (list of professions subject to foreseeability standard in California).
31. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d-at 812, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221.
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Reasoning by analogy, the International Mortgage Co. court traced
the history of attorney liability in California. 32 Although attorneys
were traditionally beneficiaries of the privity rule,33 the California
Supreme Court rejected this rule in favor of a balancing test developed
in Biakanja v. Irving.34 The Biakanja balancing test was held applicable
to attorneys in Lucas v. Hamm 5.3 The demise of the privity requirement
for lawyers in California was completed in Heyer v. Flaig,36 when the
California Supreme Court held attorneys to a level of care consistent
with their position of trust and knowledge. 37 The court stated that
public policy requires attorneys to act in accordance with the foresee-
ability standard, to protect adequately the rights and interests of
persons affected by the actions of the attorneys.38
Similarly, the International Mortgage Co. court emphasized the
public role of accountants.3 9 Dubbed "public watchdogs" by the
32. Id. at 812-14, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22.
33. Id. In National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195, 200 (1880), the United States,Supreme Court held "[b]eyond all doubt, the general rule is that the obligation of the attorneyis to his client and not to a third party. . . ." California soon followed, adopting the privity
rule followed by the National Savings Bank Court in Buckley v. Gray, 110 Cal. 339, 42 P. 900(1895). Buckley was expressly overruled in Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 651, 320 P.2d 16,
19 (1958) and in Lucas v. Harem, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 588, 364 P.2d 685, 687, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821,
823 (1964).
34. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 813, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22. See
Biakanja, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (action for damages against notary public for drawinginvalid will). The Biakanja factors include the extent to which the transaction was intended to
affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that theplaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and
the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy of
preventing future harm. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
35. 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (1961). In Lucas, the defendant attorney
was retained to prepare a client's will and subsequent codicils. The instruments designated
plaintiffs as beneficiaries of a trust. The instruments violated the rule against perpetuities and
were thus invalid. As a result of the attorney's negligence, plaintiffs were deprived of the trust
intended for them. Instead, plaintiffs were forced to settle with the testator's blood relatives for
a sum $75,000 less than they would have received in the absence of defendant's negligence. Id.
at 586-87, 364 P.2d at 686-87, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 822-23. The court held that an attorney is liable
to foreseeable third parties for injuries caused by the attorney's negligence. The court ruled,however, that drafting a will that violated the rule against perpetuities was not negligent, due to
the complex nature of the law. Id. at 592, 364 P.2d at 690, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 826. See CAL. CIV.
CODE § 715.2 (West 1982) (rule against perpetuities; vesting of interest in property).
36. 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969). In Heyer, the testatrix engaged
the defendant attorney to prepare a will leaving the testatrix's entire estate to her two daughters,
plaintiffs. At the same time, the testatrix informed the defendant of her ensuing marriage. The
defendant negligently failed to mention the testatrix's new husband in the will, thus entitling him
to a portion of the estate as a posttestamentary spouse. CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 6560-6562 (WestSupp. 1986). The court adopted the rationale of Lucas, holding that an intended beneficiary of
a will acquires a right of action against a negligent attorney. Heyer, 70 Cal. 2d at 225, 449 P.2d
at 162, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
37. Heyer, 70 Cal. 2d at 228-29, 449 P.2d at 164-65, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 228-29.
38. Id.
39. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
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United States Supreme Court, 40 accountants have assumed a role of
public trust and responsibility that extends beyond the auditor-client
relationship. 41 This role requires that the accountant maintain complete
independence from the client and report on the client's financial
position and results of operation objectively. 42 The California Court
of Appeal was careful to point out that the accountant does not
guarantee that the client's financial statements are completely true and
without fault. 43 Instead, the accountant's certification merely warrants
that the statements fairly present the financial position of the firm in
accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
as codified by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA).44
The International Mortgage Co. court also noted that the risk of
loss is more appropriately placed upon the accounting profession than
the innocent consumer. 45 The accounting profession, according to the
court, is able to pass the risk to its clients and the ultimate consuming
806, 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 224. An independent auditor is employed to analyze a client's
financial status and make public the findings in accordance with recognized accounting principles.
This undertaking is imbued with considerations of public trust. The accountant must realize the
finished product will be relied upon by creditors, stockholders, investors, lenders, or anyone else
involved in the financial concerns of the audited client. Id. See also AmERICAN INsTrrrE OF
CERTIFIED PuBLIc AccouNTANTs, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, CODE OF PROFE SSIONAL ETcs (CCH)
ET § 51.04 (1978) [hereinafter cited as AICPA] (emphasizing accountant's role of responsibility
to the public).
40. United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984). Chief Justice Burger
described the role of the independent auditor as follows:
An independent certified public accountant performs a different role. By certifying the
public reports that collectively depict a corporation's financial status, the independent
auditor assumes a public responsibility transcending any employment relationship with
the client. The independent public accountant performing this special function owes
ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and stockholders, as well as to the
investing public. This "public watchdog" function demands that the accountant
maintain total independence from the client at all times and requires complete fidelity
to the public trust. To insulate from disclosure a certified public accountant's inter-
pretations of the client's financial statements would be to ignore the significance of
the accountant's role as a disinterested analyst charged with public obligations.
Id. at 817-18.
41. Id. at 818.
42. Id.
43. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 817, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225.
44. Id. The professional standards of the AICPA express the auditor's function as follows:
"The objective of the ordinary examination of financial statements by the independent auditor
is the expression of an opinion on the fairness with which they present financial position, results
of operations, and changes in financial position in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles." AICPA, supra note 39, § 110.01, at 61. The AICPA has promulgated reporting
standards which govern the preparation of financial statements. The standards require that the
report specifically state that the financial statements are in accordance with generally accepted
accounting principles, and further provide an expression of an opinion or reasons why no opinion
can be given as to the adequacy of the reports. Id. vol. A, § 150.02, at 81-82.
45. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 821, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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public through the cost of accounting services and insurance1 6 As a
general proposition, the International Mortgage Co. court held that
the same standard should govern the imposition of negligence liability,
regardless of the defendant's profession.47
The California Court of Appeal cited with approval the recent
holdings of the New Jersey and Wisconsin Supreme Courts,48 which
extended the foreseeability standard of negligence liability to account-
ants. 49 The International Mortgage Co. court concluded that society
is better served by holding accountants to a foreseeability standard. 0
The foreseeability standard provides financial disincentive for negligent
conduct and will heighten the profession's use of cautionary tech-
niques.-"
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. History of Accountant Liability to Third Parties for Negligence
Liability of accountants to third parties can be traced back to 1919.52
In Landell v. Lybrand 3 the plaintiff, relying upon an accountant's
46. Id. But see infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (discussion of ability of accountants
to bear risk of loss).
47. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 818-19, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26. See,
e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (car
manufacturers); Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 27 Cal. 3d 916, 923, 616 P.2d 813, 817, 167Cal. Rptr. 831, 835 (1980) (physicians); J'Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 24 Cal. 3d 799, 804-05, 598P.2d 60, 63, 157 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (1979) (general contractors); Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ.
of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434-35, 551 P.2d 334, 342-43, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22-23 (1976)(psychiatrists); Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 62, 377 P.2d 897, 900,27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 700 (1963) (tool manufacturers); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 589, 364P.2d 685, 688, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824 (1961) (attorneys); Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647,
651, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (1958) (notaries public); Huber, Hunt & Nichols, Inc. v. Moore, 67 Cal.App. 3d 278, 301, 136 Cal. Rptr. 603, 617 (1977) (architects); M. Miller Co. v. Dames & Moore,
198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 308, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13, 15 (1961) (engineers).
48. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 352, 461 A.2d 138, 153 (1983); Citizens State Bank
v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 385-86, 335 N.W.2d 361, 365-66 (1983).
49. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 819, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 226.
50. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
51. Id.
52. Note, Public Accountants and Attorneys: Negligence and the Third Party, 47 NoTrE
DAmNi LAW. 588, 596-600 (1972) (analysis of former scope of accountant liability to third par-ties). See also Note, Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler: CPAs Liable at Common Law to Certain
Reasonably Foreseeable Third Parties Who Detrimentally Rely on Negligently Audited Finan-
cial Statements, 70 CoaRnEu L. REV. 335 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rosenblum v. Adler](review of historical background of accountant liability to third parties through Rosenblum v.Adler); Levitin, Accountants' Scope of Liability for Defective Financial Reports, 15 HasrnCsL.J. 436 (1964) (discussing the scope of accountant liability); HaWkins, Professional NegligenceLiability of Public Accountants, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1959) (analysis of how concepts of
professional negligence are applied to accountants).
53. 264 Pa. 406, 107 A. 783 (1919).
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report, purchased stock in a company. However, the company's fi-
nancial statements were in error, and negligent auditing by the accoun-
tant led to an incorrect opinion on the financial statements. The stock
was in fact valueless. Since no contract existed between the parties
and fraud was not proven, the court held that the accountant owed
no duty to the plaintiffs.5 4
The Landell rationale, however, was questioned by the New York
decision of Glanzer v. Shepard55 Although Glanzer involved the
liability of public weighers, the circumstances are analogous to those
in accountant liability cases. In Glanzer, the plaintiffs purchased beans.
The total price was to be determined on the basis of weight sheets
certified by public weighers. When the plaintiffs discovered that the
recorded weight was erroneous, they sued the weighers for overpay-
ment.5 6 The court found that the plaintiffs' use of the certificates was
the "end and aim" of the transaction.5 7 Notwithstanding the theory
of Landell, the New York court held the public weigher liable for
negligence when reliance on the certified statements by third persons
was foreseeable. 8
The New York court defined the liability of accountants to third
parties in Ultramares v. Touche.5 9 In Ultramares, Fred Stem and
Company employed an accounting firm to conduct an annual audit.60
The accountants negligently failed to detect Stern's overvaluation of
the company's assets. 6' The plaintiff, who loaned money to Stem in
reliance upon the audited balance sheet, successfully sued the account-
ants on the theory of negligence.6 2 On appeal, however, the appellate
court reversed the decision of the lower court on the negligence action.63
The appellate court reasoned that holding accountants liable for neg-
ligence to parties not in privity of contract would "expose accountants
54. Id. at 406, 107 A. at 783. This was nothing more than a restatement of the rule
established in Winterbottom v. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Ex. 1842). In Winterbottom, the
court held that the breach of a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair could not give rise to a
cause of action by a passenger in the coach who was injured when it collapsed. Id. at 405. The
court stated that "[uinless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the parties who
enter into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences, to which I can see no limit,
would ensue." Id.
55. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
56. Id. at 237-38, 135 N.E. at 275.
57. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275.
58. Id. at 238-39, 135 N.E. at 275-76.
59. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
60. Id. at 173, 174 N.E. at 442.
61. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 193, 174 N.E. at 450.
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to a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to
an indeterminate class.''
Rather than overrule Glanzer, Justice Cardozo merely distinguished
it on the facts. 65 Although the service in Glanzer was rendered primarily
for the plaintiffs' benefit, the plaintiff in Ultramares was only an
incidental beneficiary of the accountant's services. 66 Later courts ig-
nored this distinction and interpreted Ultramares as holding that
accountants owe no duty to persons not in privity of contract. 67
In Investment Corp. v. Buchman,8 for example, the plaintiff desired
to purchase a large block of stock in the Belcher-Young Company.
One condition of the purchase was that Belcher would provide the
plaintiff with certified financial statements. The accountants retained
to audit the statements allegedly knew that the plaintiff would rely on
the information in deciding whether to buy the stock or rescind the
contract. 69 The Florida Supreme Court held that the accountants owed
no duty to the plaintiffs because, though known to the defendants,
the plaintiffs were not in privity of contract with the defendants.70
The court recognized that there were policy arguments in favor of
64. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444. Even as accountants' liability was limited by requiring
privity before a duty could be found, the court recognized such a holding was against the flow
of common law. Justice Cardozo observed "[t]he assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding
in these days apace." Id. at 180, 174 N.E. at 445.
65. Id. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446. For a discussion of the distinction drawn by Justice
Cardozo, see wiener, Common Law Liability of the Certified Public Accountant for Negligent
Misrepresentation, 20 SAN DMo L. REv. 233, 242-44 (1980). The International Mortgage Co.
court rejected the accountant's argument that the "end and aim" analysis of Glanzer was applied
in Ultramares and should also be applied in this case. International Mortgage Co. v. John P.
Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d 806, 814-16, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 222-24.
66. Ultramares, 255 N.Y. at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
67. See generally C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1955) (to establish
liability for negligence, jury must find that financial reports were made for "primary benefit"
of plaintiff); O'Conner v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 1937) (strict adherence to rule of
Ultramares that accountants are not liable for ordinary negligence in the absence of privity of
contract); State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 111, 15 N.E.2d 416, 418 (1938) (in
absence of contractual relationship, accountants not liable for ordinary negligence even though
aware of possible use of reports by company to obtain credit); Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen,
131 N.Y.S.2d 20, 24 (1954), aff'd., 285 App. Div. 867, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1955) (in absence of
privity of contract, fraud must be shown for plaintiff to recover). The inaccurate interpretation
of Ultramares has been applied in cases factually similar to Glanzer in which a negligent
misrepresentation was relied upon by a known third party for a specific transaction. Candler v.
Crane, Christmas & Co., [1951] 2 K.B. 164, 183-84. See Seavey, Candler v. Crane, Christmas
& Co.-Negligent Misrepresentation by Accountants, 67 LAw Q. Rev. 466 (1951) (criticizing
Candler).
68. 208 So. 2d 291 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
69. Id. at 292. See Note, Accountant's Liability to Third Parties for Negligence, 23 U.
MiAN L. Rev. 256 (1968) (discussing Investment Corp. in depth).
70. Investment Corp., 208 So. 2d at 294 (citing Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar.
Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195, 198 (1940)).
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both parties, but felt bound by precedent to apply the privity rule. 71
As the social role of accountants changed, dissatisfaction with the
privity limitation intensified.7 2 Many jurisdictions adopted the rule
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which essentially represents a
compromise between the privity rule and the foreseeability rule.73 The
Restatement provides that accountants owe a duty of care to known
or intended third party users of financial statements and to third
persons who are members of a known or intended class of users of
financial statements.
7 4
An early decision adopting the Restatement approach was Rusch
Factors, Inc. v. Levin.7 5 A Rhode Island corporation hired an ac-
countant to audit financial statements for the purpose of obtaining
a loan from the plaintiff. On the basis of the financial statements,
the plaintiff lent more than $337,000 to the corporation. After the
corporation went into receivership, the plaintiff brought a tort action
against the accountant.76 The federal district court held that the
accountant was liable in negligence for careless financial misrepre-
sentations relied upon by actually foreseen and limited classes of
persons.7 7 Reasoning that the burden of malpractice was more ap-
propriately placed on the accountant than on an innocent plaintiff,
7 8
the court noted the accountant is in a better position than the plaintiff
to spread the risk of loss to consumers.79 Finally, the court speculated
that the Restatement rule would encourage the improvement of
cautionary techniques used by the accounting profession.
80
71. Investment Corp., 208 So. 2d at 295-96. The court relied on Sickler v. Indian River
Abstracts & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940) (abstractor not liable to persons with
whom there is no privity of contract), and State St. Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. at 104, 15
N.E.2d 416 (1938) (interpreting Ultramares as meaning an accountant could not be liable for
ordinary negligence in the absence of a contractual relationship).
72. Comment, Rosenblum v. Adler: The New Jersey Supreme Court Expands Accountants'
Liability, 37 RuroERs L. REv. 161, 167 (1984).
73. REsTATEimNT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin,
284 F. Supp. 85, 90, 92-93 (D.R.I. 1968) (accountants liable to third party they knew would rely
on audited financial statements); Ryan v. Kanne, 170 N.W.2d 395, 401-03 (Iowa 1969) (account-
ants liable to third party they knew would rely on accounts payable information); Shatterproof
Glass Corp. v. James, 466 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (duty of care owed to creditor
to whom accountant knew audit would be given).
74. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 552 (1977). Several illustrations pertaining to public
accountants are found in the comments to § 552.
75. 284 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.I. 1968).
76. Id. at 86-87.
77. Id. at 92-93.
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The Iowa Supreme Court was the next court to adopt the Res-
tatement approach. In Ryan v. Kanne,8' an accounting firm brought
an action to recover auditing fees despite the fact that the defendants'
financial statements had been negligently audited. 82 The accountants
were hired, at the insistence of one of the defendants' creditors, to
audit financial statements with particular attention to accounts pay-
able. Further, the accountants were advised of both the purpose of
the audit and the possibility that the defendants' business would be
taken over. In auditing the financial statements, the accountants
failed to discover several errors. A reaudit performed by another
firm disclosed a discrepancy in accounts payable of over $33,000.11
The Iowa Supreme Court, in ruling on a defendant's counterclaim
for negligence, rejected the strict rule of Ultramares and applied the
analysis of Levin to hold the accountants liable to a limited class of
foreseeable plaintiffs.84 The Ryan court did not determine whether
the rule of liability should be relaxed to extend to all foreseeable
persons who may rely on the reports, but reasoned that lack of
privity of contract is not a valid defense when the accountant is
aware that third parties will rely on the financial statements.85
B. Recent Trend in Accountant Liability to Third Parties
Labeling the Restatement rule a "compromise position" 8 grounded
on a "social fallacy, ' 87 commentators urged the adoption of a general
foreseeability standard for accountant liability.88 Taking issue with
the Ultramares/Restatement fear that expanded liability would bring
financial ruin to the accounting profession, these commentators pointed
both to the ready availability of malpractice insurance and to the
81. 170 N.W.2d 395 (Iowa 1969).
82. Id. at 396, 401.
83. Id. at 397-99.
84. Id. at 401.
85. Id. at 403.
86. Besser, Privity?-An Obsolete Approach to the Liability of Accountants to Third Parties,7 STOrN HAn L. REv. 507, 527 (1976) (Restatement position allows accountants to escape liability
by showing no knowledge of intended recipients).
87. Wiener, supra note 65, at 259 (reasons in support of Ultramares and Restatement
position provide no persuasive rationale for treating accountants differently from other potential
defendants).
88. Besser, supra note 86; Wiener, supra note 65. But see Comment, Auditors' Third Party
Liability: An Ill-Considered Extension of Law, 46 WASH. L. Rnv. 675, 676 (1971) (expandedliability will probably result in injury to the auditing profession); Comment, Accountants' Liability
to the Third Party and Public Policy: A Calabresi Approach, 39 Sw. L.J. 689, 690 (1985)(imposition of accountant liability to all foreseeable persons for negligence is not economically
or legally justifiable) [hereinafter cited as Comment, A Calabresi Approach].
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continued economic viability of the accounting profession despite
exposure to expanded liability under federal securities law and the
Restatement. 9 Finally, in 1983, the supreme courts of two states held
accountants to a general foreseeability standard.9
In Rosenblum v. Adler,9' an accounting firm negligently audited
the financial statements of a publicly held corporation. Relying on
the financial statements, the plaintiffs acquired stock in the corpo-
ration in conjunction with the sale of their business to the corpora-
tion. 92 The stock proved to be worthless. 9 In holding the accountants
liable for the plaintiffs' losses, the New Jersey Supreme Court
reasoned that whether or not the accountants actually knew of the
plaintiffs, it was reasonably foreseeable that the financial statements
would be used in connection with the corporation's business trans-
actions .94
Similarly, in Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 95 an
accounting firm audited financial statements for Clintonville Fire
Apparatus, Incorporated (CFA).9 After reviewing the financial state-
ments, the plaintiffs extended loans to CFA.97 During a subsequent
audit, the accounting firm's employees discovered material errors in
the financial statements. 98 After these errors were corrected, all of
CFA's creditors were notified, and the plaintiffs called in all loans
made to CFA. 99 As a result, CFA went into receivership. The
plaintiffs filed suit against the accounting firm seeking the amount
due on the loans.lt0 Affirming the decision of the lower court, the
appellate court concluded that even if the Restatement was the law
in Wisconsin, Citizens Bank was not within the limited class protected
by the provisions of the Restatement.'0l The Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed, holding the Restatement's limited scope to be too
89. See Comment, supra note 72, at 168. See also Comment, Auditors' Responsibility for
Misrepresentation: Inadequate Protection for Users of Financial Statements, 44 WAsH. L. REv.
139, 151 (1968); Wiener, supra note 65, at 250; Besser, supra note 86, at 534-37.
90. Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983); Citizens State Bank v. Timm,
Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).
91. 93 N.J. 324, 461 A.2d 138 (1983).
92. Id. at 329, 461 A.2d at 140-41.
93. Id. at 329, 461 A.2d at 141.
94. Id. at 355, 461 A.2d at 154.
95. 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335 N.W.2d 361 (1983).




100. Id. at 379, 335 N.W.2d at 362.
101. Id. at 382, 335 N.W.2d at 364.
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restrictive and inconsistent with Wisconsin negligence law making a
tortfeasor liable fo all foreseeable consequences of his acts. 102
The rationale of both courts was nearly identical to that of Levin.'10
Rosenblum and Citizens, however, rejected the limited nature of the
Restatement in favor of liability to all foreseeable plaintiffs. The
California Court of Appeal in International Mortgage Co. relied on
the same rationale to hold accountants to the foreseeability standard.
Like New Jersey and Wisconsin, the California court rejected the
Restatement view in favor of the foreseeability standard, finding the
protectionist rule of Ultramares and the limited liability imposed
under the Restatement inconsistent with California's negligence law. 04
III. LEGAL RAMFCATIONS
International Mortgage Co. extends the liability of accountants to
third parties who reasonably and foreseeably rely on the accountant's
audited statements. 1 5 The expansion of liability is based on several
policy considerations, including appropriate placement of risk, cost
spreading, and deterrence. 106 The International Mortgage Co. court,
however, failed to consider adequately the effects of the holding on
the accounting profession and society in general. 10 7
Under the new law announced in International Mortgage Co.,
accountants will bear the full risk of loss for negligence in the
preparation and issuance of unqualified financial statements. 108 Im-
position of this burden is based on the assumption that the accounting
102. Id. at 386, 335 N.W.2d at 366.
103. See supra notes 75-80 and accompanying text (discussion of Levin).
104. International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp., 177 Cal. App. 3d
806, 819-20, 223 Cal. Rptr. 218, 226-27. But see Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen &
Co., 493 N.Y.S.2d 435, 483 N.E.2d 110 (1985), in which the New York Court of Appeals
deferred to the Ultramares standard. The court held that to maintain an action against an
accountant, a plaintiff must be either in privity with the accountant or meet the following
prerequisites: (1) the accountant must have been aware that the financial reports were to be used
for a particular purpose; (2) the accountant must have known that the client intended that a
known party would rely on the reports in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) the accountant
must have done something linking him or her to that party which evinces the accountant's
understanding of that party's reliance. Id. at 443, 483 N.E.2d at 118.
105. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 812, 818, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 221, 225-
26.
106. Id. at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
107. See Comment, A Calabresi Approach, supra note 88, at 690.
108. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227. Often the
accountant is only secondarily liable, since the accountant relies on management. When a business
fails, however, the accountant is seen as the deep pocket and the only one available to reimburse
the plaintiff for the resulting losses. Collins, Minimizing Risk for CPAs is Focus of AICPA
Conference, 161 J. ACCT., July 1986, at 52.
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profession will be able to pass the risk to its clients and the ultimate
consuming public through insurance and the increased cost of ac-
countant services. 1 9 The validity of this assumption is questionable,
however," ° since the cost of liability insurance has become prohibi-
tive."' The smaller accounting firms are being hit the hardest, since
litigation will usually be limited to cases involving commercial trans-
actions that do not fall under the securities laws." 2 Those cases
generally involve smaller businesses dealing with smaller accounting
firms." 3 Of the nearly one dozen insurance companies which formerly
offered liability insurance for smaller accounting firms, only three
companies still offer coverage.1 4 Strict adherence to the foreseeability
standard may result in insurance becoming completely unavailable to
small accounting firms.
Due to the increased cost of insurance, all accounting firms may
be forced to increase fees substantially.' '5 An increase in fees will
make it more difficult for smaller companies to afford the audited
financial statements needed to solicit and transact business." 6 Fur-
thermore, as a result of the unavailability or prohibitive cost of
insurance, many accounting firms may simply withdraw from the
audit market altogether. The exodus of smaller accounting firms will
further narrow the choices of smaller companies needing audited
statements. " 7 Perhaps this limitation of choice will result in an
increasing willingness by lenders and other third parties dealing with
109. Galen, Litigation Blitz Hits Accountants, 8 NAT'L L.J. No. 40, 1 (1986).
110. Id. at 26. Due largely to the increase in litigation, small and medium sized accounting
firms are experiencing an insurance shortage which may force many of them out of the market.
Id.
111. See id.; Continuing Education of the Bar, Accountants Owe a Duty of Care to
Foreseeable Plaintiffs, CAL. Bus. L. RTra. 239 (May 1986) [hereinafter cited as Accountants
Owe Duty]; Collins, supra note 108, at 52; Note, Rosenblum v. Adler, supra note 52, at 350-
54.
112. Galen, supra note 109, at 26 (cases not governed by securities laws generally involve
medium amounts of money and are between smaller businesses and smaller accounting firms).
113. Id.
114. See id. Of those firms offering liability insurance to small companies, one has stopped
writing policies for individual accountants and anticipates ending its group policy plan for the
California Society of CPAs. For those companies still offering liability insurance to smaller
firms, premiums and deductibles have skyrocketed while maximum coverage has plummeted.
Larger firms have also indicated that similar insurance problems are affecting them; "[j]udgments
and settlements of lawsuits involving accountants have been huge, . . . $180,000,000 for the 8
larger CPA firms since 1980, and insurance for all firms has become limited and prohibitively
expensive." Collins, supra note 108, at 52.
115. Accountants Owe Duty, supra note 111, at 240.
116. Id.
117. See supra note 108.
1067
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 18
nonpublic entities to rely on reports prepared in engagements of
lesser scope than an audit.118
Indeed, accountants may begin to issue audited reports that contain
disclaimer language 9 to shield themselves from liability under the
foreseeability rule.1 20 Auditors may also attempt to protect themselves
by the use of an express limitation upon the persons or class of
persons who may rely on the audit.'2 1 If limitation provisions and
disclaimers effectively limit the liability of accountants, International
Mortgage Co. may reduce the accountant's incentive to conduct full
scope audits.' 22 Paradoxically, the policy of encouraging more thor-
ough audits by placing the risk of loss on accountants may be entirely
thwarted by the probable reaction to the extension of liability in
International Mortgage Co.
An examination of the results of the application of the foreseea-
bility standard to other professionals provides some insight as to
what the future may hold for the accounting profession. For example,
the application of the foreseeability rule to the medical profession
caused a tremendous increase in the cost of malpractice insurance.
This increase in turn threatened the quality and quantity of available
medical services. 2 1 In response to these dangers, the Medical Injury
Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) was enacted in 1975.124 Among
118. Accountants Owe Duty, supra note 111, at 240. Engagements of lesser scope are the
compilation or review of financial statements. A compilation of financial statements consists of
presenting in the form of financial statements information that is the representation of manage-
ment without the accountant undertaking to express any assurance on the statements. A review
of financial statements occurs when the accountant performs an inquiry and analytical procedure
that provides the accountant with a reasonable basis for expressing limited assurance that there
are no material modifications that should be made to the statements in order for them to be in
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles. American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, Professional Standards, AR § 100, Compilation and Review of Financial Statements
(SSARS No. 1 1978).
119. See Rosenblum v. Adler, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152; Comment, supra note 72,
at 189-90.
120. Rosenblum, 93 N.J. at 351, 461 A.2d at 152; Comment, supra note 72, at 189-90.
121. See Comment, supra note 72, at 189-90.
122. Id. (the universal availability of the disclaimer device would substantially undercut the
policy goals advanced by the adoption of the broad foreseeability rule); Solomon, Ultramares
Revisited: A Modern Study of Accountants' Liability to the Public, 18 DE PAuL L. REv. 56, 83
(1968) (the widespread use of disclaimers of opinion as a device for avoiding liability would not
produce a satisfactory solution, but would only further compound problems due to its conse-
quences on the credit standing of the client and its ultimate destruction of the accountant's very
purpose for existence); Besser, supra note 86, at 541 (the use of disclaimers is permissible,
although an accountant cannot disclaim liability for all negligent representations in the report).
See C.I.T. Fin. Corp. v. Glover, 224 F.2d 44, 46 (2d Cir. 1955) (effect of a disclaimer should
ultimately be a question for the jury).
123. Proclamation by the Governor, 1975 Cal. Stat. at 3947.
124. Id. ch. 1, at 3949 (2d Extra. Sess.). See also Review of Selected 1975 California Legisla-
tion, 7 PAC. L.J. 544 (1976) (review of MICRA amendments).
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the provisions in MICRA is a statute of limitations requirement that
all actions for negligence be commenced within three years of the
date of the injury or one year after the date the injury was or should
have been discovered, whichever occurs first, 125 and a $250,000 ceiling
on recovery for noneconomic damages.126
Similarly, real estate brokers became liable under the foreseeability
standard in 1984.127 The initial impact was devastating, resulting in
dramatic increases in the cost of insurance and general confusion
about the duty owed to buyers. 128 In response to the immediate
movement for protective legislation, remedial legislation was passed
in 1985.129 Among the statutory provisions passed was a detailed
description of the standard of care required of the real estate broker,
a description of the precise scope of inspection required, a two-year
statute of limitations for breach of duty actions, and the imposition
of a duty of reasonable care on the buyer to protect himself through
diligent attention and observation. 30
The effect of International Mortgage Co. on the accounting profes-
sion will be manifested to some degree in the area of liability
insurance, causing an impact on the availability and affordability of
coverage.' The long-term effects, as yet, remain uncertain. Concern
within the profession that the extension of the foreseeability standard
may result in the diminished ability of the accounting profession to
certify financial statements is justified. The smaller firms are espe-
cially concerned because of the importance of the audit to the
livelihood of the small accounting firm. The countervailing consid-
eration, however, is that allowing accountants to operate under a
lenient liability standard or shielded from liability by broad disclai-
mers does little to promote cautionary operating techniques. 32 The
California Court of Appeal has clearly stated that accountants must
join the ranks of other professionals and face liability for negligence
under the foreseeability standard. 33 In light of the effect the strict
125. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 340.5 (West 1982).
126. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1986).
127. Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
128. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 223, sec. 4, at -(imprecision of terms in Easton and absence of
comprehensive declaration of duties, standards, and exceptions has caused modification of
insurance coverage for real estate licensees and caused confusion as to manner of performing
duty ascribed by court).
129. 1985 Cal. Stat. ch. 223, at -(enacting CAL. CrV. CODE § 2079 (West Supp. 1987)).
130. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 2079.2-2079.5 (vest 1987).
131. See supra notes 108-14 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
133. International Mortgage Co., 177 Cal. App. 3d at 820, 223 Cal. Rptr. at 227.
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foreseeability standard has had on other professions,1 4 the probability
is high that the accounting profession will soon approach the legis-
lature to seek a reprive from a deluge of litigation.
CONCLUSION
In International Mortgage Co., the California Court of Appeal
held that the accounting profession is subject to the same judicial
criteria governing other professionals in the area of liability to third
parties for negligence. International Mortgage Co. did not place a
limit on the extension of the foreseeability standard. The International
Mortgage Co. court based its holding on three policy factors: (1)
appropriate placement of risk on accountants rather than innocent
plaintiffs; (2) the ability of the accounting profession to better spread
this risk to its clients and the ultimate consuming public; and (3)
general considerations of deterrence. Unfortunately, the court failed
to consider thoroughly the implications of the expansion of liability.
First, the court rather unrealisitically failed to recognize that lia-
bility insurance is available only at a very high cost. The ability of
accountants to spread the risk of loss is therefore diminished. Indeed,
the ability of smaller accounting firms to continue in business may
be jeopardized. Second, the prospect of expanded liability may
encourage accounting firms to adopt devices such as provisions
limiting reliance and disclaimers qualifying audit reports in order to
restrict potential liability. Thus, the deterrence aspect of International
Mortgage Co. may be thwarted. Legislative relief appears to be the
only solution to the dramatic increase in litigation that will surely
arise as a result of the extension of the foreseeability standard to
accountants.
Ann Simmons
134. See supra notes 123-30 and accompanying text.
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